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FESTO: BLESSING TO PATENT HOLDERS OR THORN IN THEIR 
SIDES? 
The Supreme Court makes another attempt to strike a balance between 
protecting an inventor’s patent rights and ensuring adequate notice to 
the public of what constitutes patent infringement.  This iBrief discusses 
the Supreme Court ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,1 and its foreseeable effects on the practice of patent 
law. 
On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court changed the doctrine of equivalents as we now 
know it.  Their earlier decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,2 
held that any patent application amendment made for patentability purposes which narrows the 
scope of the patent is subject to prosecution history estoppel.3  This latest decision overrules the 
Federal Circuit’s holding that when it applies, estoppel acts as a complete bar against any claim 
of equivalence.4  The Supreme Court held that an amendment creates a presumption that estoppel 
bars such a claim, but that presumption is rebuttable.5  In order to rebut the presumption, a 
patentee “must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably 
be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged 
equivalent.”6  The Court further held that not only is the burden on the patentee to show that an 
amendment was not made for the purpose of patentability,7 but he or she must also show that the 
amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question.8 
Background 
Facts 
Festo Corporation is the owner of two patents for a “magnetic rodless cylinder, a piston-
driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system.”9  After submitting 
its initial patent application, Festo amended the claims of its applications.  The amendments to the 
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first application were made after the patent examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. §112.10  
The examiner stated that the claims themselves were unclear and were made in an impermissible 
way.  The amendments of both applications had the effect of adding a new limitation to the 
patents.  Specifically, the claims of both patents were amended to recite a pair of sealing rings, 
each having a lip on one side.  The claims of the first application were also amended to limit the 
outer shell (“sleeve”) to magnetizable material. 
After issuance of the patents, Festo filed suit, claiming that a device placed in the market 
by defendants, Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. (“SMC”) infringed Festo’s patents 
under the doctrine of equivalents.  The accused device employs a single sealing ring with a two-
way lip, rather than a pair each having a lip on one side, and contains a sleeve that is made of a 
non-magnetizable alloy, rather than a magnetizable material.  The device, therefore, does not fall 
within the literal claims of Festo’s patents. 
Competing Sides 
It is important to note that conflicting interests lie at the heart of patent law.  In particular, 
there is a realistic need for clear and concise boundaries to a patentee’s rights under his patent.  
The patentee and the public both need to be able to determine what is and is not covered under 
the patent.  Working against this, however, are the inadequacies of any language as well as the 
patentee’s inability to predict the directions his or her and other technologies will take.  The most 
certain alternative for providing clear and unquestionable notice to the public and the patentee of 
the boundaries of a patent would be to limit the coverage of the claims to only that which they 
literally convey.  However, because there are not always words that can be used to relay every 
aspect of an invention, this could severely limit the value and scope of the patent.   
In order to strike a balance between these competing sides, the Supreme Court has 
adopted the doctrine of equivalents, but has limited its use by employing prosecution history 
estoppel.  In theory, therefore, the patent holder is granted greater leeway in enforcing his or her 
patent, but at the same time, the public is given a concrete record from which to interpret at least 
the amended terms of the patent and what is covered therein. 
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Doctrine of Equivalents 
The doctrine of equivalents holds that a patentee can claim rights to inconsequential 
alterations to the thing patented, which are not literally covered by the original claims, but that 
could be achieved with little effort.  In other words, it protects a patentee from infringement by a 
person who makes insubstantial changes to the patented invention, taking the new device out of 
the literal realm of the claims, yet basically embodying the same invention.11  The theory is that 
“if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the 
same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape.”12   
The Supreme Court first adopted the doctrine in Winans v. Denmead in 1854.13  In 
Winans, the patent at issue involved a new mode of operation for railroad cars.14  The accused 
device employed this same mode of operation; however, the geometrical form of the cars was 
different than that claimed by the patentee.15  The Court held that because “[t]he exclusive right to 
the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of it, 
varying its form or proportions[,] … the patentee, having described his invention, and shown its 
principles, and claimed it in that form which most perfectly embodies it, is, in contemplation of 
law, deemed to claim every form which his invention may be copied, unless he manifests an 
intention to disclaim some of those forms.”16 
The doctrine of equivalents was invoked primarily for the purpose of accommodating for 
the inability of language “to capture the essence of innovation.”17   It recognizes that words may 
not always be able to aptly convey the basis of an invention.  It also recognizes that “to permit 
imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the 
protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”18  The Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the doctrine in 1950 in Graver Tank19 and again in 1997 in Warner-Jenkinson Co20.   
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In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of equivalents only 
applies if the differences between the accused and claimed inventions are insubstantial.  It also 
held that when considering an allegation of infringement under the doctrine an important factor to 
consider when comparing the claimed and accused invention “is whether persons reasonably 
skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient contained in the 
patent with one that was.”21 
Nearly 50 years later in Warner-Jenkinson the Court “endeavored to clarify the proper 
scope of the doctrine.”22  The Court first held that an inquiry into equivalence of an invention 
should be performed on an “element-by-element basis” rather than as a comparison of the 
inventions as a whole.23  The essential inquiry is therefore, “[d]oes the accused product or process 
contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element in the patented invention[.]”24  
The Court went on to hold that prosecution history estoppel does serve as a limit on non-literal 
infringement, but refused to apply it to all claim amendments regardless of the reasons for them.25 
Prosecution History Estoppel 
The price of this broadening of a patentee’s rights enabled under the doctrine of 
equivalents is uncertainty.  Innovators and competitors are left without a clear indication of what 
is and is not covered by a patent.  One helpful source of clarity has been the prosecution history 
of the patent.  Prosecution history estoppel dictates that the claims of a patent must be interpreted 
in light of the prosecution history, or the process through which the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) issued the patent based on a submitted application. More specifically, the claims must be 
interpreted in light of their rejections, cancellations and amendments.  A patentee is estopped 
from asserting equivalence for a claim element when, for the purpose of patentability, he or she 
has amended a claim in a way that surrenders the subject matter that he or she is now alleging is 
an equivalent.  For example, if the PTO rejects a claim, and the patentee forfeits his or her right to 
appeal the rejection and amends the claim such that the scope is narrowed, he or she cannot then 
allege infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for something that would have been literally 
covered under the original claim but that is not covered by the amended claim. 
Because the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to allow the patentee to claim what 
may have been indescribable at the time of drafting, either because of the limitations of the 
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language, unforeseeability, or general equity, when subject matter is encompassed in the original 
claim but then eliminated from it in response to a rejection in order to receive a patent, the 
applicability of the doctrine is no longer justified.  The patentee can no longer contend that he or 
she was unable to put into words or to foresee the particular subject matter, or that it would be 
equitable to interpret the claims as covering the subject matter that was surrendered.  
As stated above, in Warner-Jenkinson the Supreme Court affirmed the application of 
prosecution history estoppel to claims under the doctrine of equivalents, but refused to apply it to 
all claim amendments regardless of the reasons for them.26  To do so would be inconsistent with 
prior cases and could “upset the basic assumptions of the PTO without substantial reason for 
doing so.”27  The Court held that there is a presumption that the amendment was made for a 
reason relating to patentability, and therefore, the patentee is estopped from claiming 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents with respect to that claim.28  However, the 
patentee is given the opportunity to rebut this presumption with evidence indicating a different 
reason behind the amendment.29 
Holding of Festo 
The district court held that because the amendments made by Festo during the 
prosecution process were not made with the purpose of overcoming prior art, they did not invoke 
prosecution history estoppel and Festo was not barred from claiming infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents .30  SMC’s device, therefore, was held to infringe Festo’s patents.31      
The Federal Circuit affirmed.32  However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded33 in 
light of its decision in Warner-Jenkinson where the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of equivalents, 
but recognized that competitors should be able to rely on the prosecution history, when an 
amendment is made for the purpose of attaining a patent, to ensure that the subject matter 
surrendered by that amendment cannot later be recaptured by the patentee.34  On remand, the 
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that estoppel arises whenever any amendment is made to the 
claims in order to comply with the Patent Act, not just amendments made to avoid or escape prior 
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art.35  The court went on to hold that whenever estoppel applies, it acts as a complete bar to any 
claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.36  This was in sharp contrast to the 
flexible bar that was applied in prior cases.  The court justified its disregard of precedent by 
concluding that the flexible bar had proved unworkable.37 
The end result was that the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that 
prosecution history estoppel applies to all claim amendments, but held that it does not create a 
complete bar to claims of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.38  Now, a rebuttable 
presumption is created in favor of the alleged infringer and the burden is on the patentee to prove 
not only that the amendment was not made for patentability, but also that the subject matter of the 
alleged equivalent was not surrendered by the amendment and that the particular equivalent was 
not foreseeable at the time the claim was amended.39 
Festo’s Impact on Patent Law 
The ruling in Festo made three significant changes to the prior law regarding the doctrine 
of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel.  First, it makes prosecution history estoppel 
applicable to any claim amendment made during the course of prosecution proceedings.  This is 
in contrast to its prior application only to amendments made for a limited number of reasons.  
Second, it eliminates the complete bar to the use of the doctrine of equivalents imposed by the 
Federal Circuit whenever an amendment is made.  This enabled patentees to assert claims of 
equivalence despite amendments made during the prosecution proceedings.  Third, the Court 
added guidelines on how the flexible bar should be applied.  These guidelines shift more of the 
burden onto the patentee to disprove the presumption that he surrendered any right to equivalence 
when he made the amendment. 
Possible Effects of Changes 
Festo has been characterized as “one of the most important patent law cases in decades,” 
and has been described as having “reaffirmed a central tenet of patent law and restored the 
inherent value of more than a million patents.”40  Rather than declaring that the inherent value of 
millions of patents has been restored, it may be more accurate to say that rights which the patent 
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holders believed that they had at the time of the prosecution proceedings have been restored to 
them.  As stated in the Supreme Court’s opinion, fundamental alterations, like the one made by 
the Federal Circuit in invoking a complete bar to claims of equivalence when no such bar had 
been in existence, “risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.”41  
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision, inventors were operating under the assumption that when 
choosing to amend a claim rather than utilizing their right to appeal a rejection, they were not 
completely giving up all rights to claims of equivalence.  Had they known that they were giving 
up such rights, they may have opted to appeal.  Thus, it would seem unfair to impose such a 
complete bar on patentees whose patents were issued prior to the ruling.  The Supreme Court’s 
reversal and reinstatement of a slightly altered, but still flexible bar, may have remedied the 
apparent injustice.   
In addition, the ruling may have the effect of increasing the costs associated with having 
a patent issued and enforcing the rights to that patent for a number of reasons.  First of all, under 
this decision patent claim drafting has the potential to be more time consuming and more 
expensive. Based on the slightly altered flexible bar established, one way to rebut the 
presumption that estoppel bars the use of the doctrine of equivalents is for the patentee to show 
that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the application.42  Patent attorneys have the 
new burden of drafting claims that incorporate every foreseeable alteration known at that time.  
This could mean increasing the number of claims tremendously in order to incorporate every 
possible angle, as well as increasing the amount of time spent researching prior art and the state 
of the inventive art at the time of filing.  Because the presumption will be against the patentee any 
time he or she amends a claim, attorneys are likely to spend more time drafting the original 
claims and to include more and narrower claims in order to ensure that they will be patentable 
without amending.  Another additional cost could arise from an increase in litigation due to the 
Supreme Court’s new guidelines that will need to be tested before they become completely clear.   
However, by rejecting the Court of Appeals’ complete bar on claims of equivalence when 
any amendment is made during the prosecution of the patent, the Supreme Court may have 
enabled smaller businesses to remain competitive.  
The previous holding of the CAFC tended to favor large companies that 
can afford procuring large numbers of patents for an invention and 
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worked against smaller companies and individuals that can typically 
pursue only a small number of patents on significant inventions.  Some 
gray in claim scope interpretation may somewhat constrain the need for 
large numbers of patent filings to protect an invention.43   
This holding seems to be a mixed blessing for patent holders.  On the one hand, it makes 
enforcing a patent easier now that the doctrine of equivalents is again available despite 
amendments made to the claims.  On the other hand, it may make proving infringement more 
difficult since now the presumption is against the patentee and the burden is on him to prove that 
the equivalent was not surrendered or foreseeable.  If the accused device emerges on the 
marketplace relatively soon after the patent is issued, it may be very difficult for a patentee to 
prove that its differences from the claims if the issued patent were indeed unforeseeable. 
Unresolved Issue 
The requirement of unforeseeability at the time of amendment raises an interesting 
question.  When a patentee is making an amendment to a claim for whatever reason, he or she is 
limited to the language in the specification.  What does he or she do then if an equivalent 
invention was not foreseeable at the time the specification was drafted, and thus the language for 
incorporating it is not present in the specification, but it has since become foreseeable?  Is it really 
accurate for the Supreme Court to say that “the patentee, as author of the claim language, may be 
expected to draft claims encompassing readily known equivalents”44 when patentees do not 
actually have the whole of the English language at their disposal?   
In addition, when a patentee is in the process of amending claims for reasons other than 
patentability, he or she must work in conjunction with the examiner.  In order to get the patent 
issued, the examiner must agree that the words used convey the required clarity of the subject 
matter.  For this reason, the words ultimately used may not have been the exact words the 
patentee would have selected given the freedom to choose without restriction.  Again, this is in 
conflict with the Supreme Court’s statement that the patentee has the freedom to choose his 
words with the knowledge of their effect. 
Conclusion 
The doctrines of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel recognize that the public 
needs to have a clear and accurate understanding of what a patent is covering.  However, they 
also recognize that because of the limitations of both language and the patentee’s knowledge at 
the time of filing an application, it is relatively impossible to literally cover all aspects of an 
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invention in one document.   Through this case, the Supreme Court has altered the application of 
both of these doctrines.  It has made the application of prosecution history estoppel more frequent 
and the doctrine of equivalents less difficult.  It remains to be seen what the effect of this ruling 
will be on the practice of patent law in general, but it is clear that it has both helped and hurt an 
innovator’s ability to attain a patent for his or her invention and to protect it from infringers. 
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